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Abstract—Whitelisting is considered an effective security mon-
itoring method for networks used in industrial control systems,
where the whitelists consist of observed tuples of the IP address
of the server, the TCP/UDP port number, and IP address of the
client (communication triplets). However, this method causes
frequent false detections. To reduce false positives due to a
simple whitelist-based judgment, we propose a new framework
for scoring communications to judge whether the communi-
cations not present in whitelists are normal or anomalous.
To solve this problem, we developed a graph convolutional
network-based suspicious communication pair estimation us-
ing relational graph convolution networks, and evaluated its
performance. For this, we collected the network traffic of
three factories owned by Panasonic Corporation, Japan. The
proposed method achieved a receiver operating characteristic
area under the curve of 0.957, which outperforms baseline
approaches such as DistMult, a method that directly optimizes
the node embeddings, and heuristics, which score the triplets
using first- and second-order proximities of multigraphs. This
method enables security operators to concentrate on significant
alerts.
1. Introduction
In industrial control systems (ICSs), significant effort has
been made to generate network communication whitelists
to detect suspicious communications. However, despite a
large number of false alerts caused by a whitelist-based
detection, there have been no methods thus far that quantify
the anomalies of communications not present on a whitelist.
Therefore, we propose a new framework for scoring com-
munications not present on a whitelist to determine whether
the communications are normal or anomalous. We propose
a graph convolutional network-based suspicious communi-
cation pair estimation (GCN SCOPE), a framework using
relational graph convolutional networks (R-GCNs). The pro-
posed method regards the problem of scoring communica-
tions not present on a whitelist as a link prediction problem
in multigraphs (graphs that are permitted to have multiple
edges, that is, edges that have the same end nodes), where
the nodes of graphs represent the IP addresses observed in
the network, and the edges of the graphs represent TCP/UDP
port numbers used between the two IP addresses.
The importance of ICS protection, including their critical
infrastructures such as power equipment and water process-
ing facilities, has rapidly increased in recent years. ICSs
used to be considered safe against malware or cyberattacks
because they were isolated from enterprise IT systems or
the Internet. However, the growing requirements of remote
monitoring, remote operations, and big data management
have rapidly introduced the concept of the Internet of Things
(IoT), and hence an increasing number of ICS networks
are connecting to IT networks or the Internet. As a result,
many cases of malware infection in ICS networks, resulting
in major damage, have been reported. There have also
been cases of social engineering attacks or attacks using
removable devices. Stuxnet [1], which was discovered in
2010, is a type of malware that invades a stand-alone com-
puter system through USB storage. Targeting Iran’s nuclear
facilities, it caused severe damage. Stuxnet is the first well-
known example of an ICS being targeted. Moreover, because
many general-purpose PCs are currently being used in ICSs,
there are many cases in which they have been accidentally
infected with malware that did not target the ICS system but
forced a suspension of the operations.
Unlike a general IT environment, network-based mon-
itoring solutions are preferred in an ICS. Differing from
most general IT environments, ICS environment requires a
continuous and stable device operation. A general PC re-
ceives frequent security updates, but in an ICS environment,
down time during an updating procedure is not allowed.
Therefore, in many cases, older system versions continued
to run. Moreover, because some devices are used for a long
time (up to 10 to 20 years), security products may not be
supported in certain cases.
In an ICS environment, although a whitelist-based detec-
tion method is thought to be effective, it may cause a signifi-
cant number of false detections. With this method, whitelists
consist of triplets (server IP address, TCP/UDP port number,
and client IP address, hereinafter called a communication
triplet), and alerts are raised when communication triplets
that have not been previously observed are noticed [2], [3].
As a result of many false detections, security operators are
forced to deal with false alerts, which makes the method
impractical.
To solve this problem, we proposed a new framework,
shown in Figure 2, to score the anomaly of unobserved
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communication triplets by learning communication triplets
observed in the training data. The output scores allow us
to filter out unimportant detection events, and focus only
on fatal alerts. Thus, the proposed method enables security
operators to concentrate on significant alerts.
We propose GCN SCOPE, a method based on the
framework, utilizing R-GCNs [4]. The flow of the proposed
method is shown in Figure 3. An R-GCN is a model pro-
posed by Schlichtkrull et al., that enables accurate link pre-
diction in multigraphs. The proposed method interprets the
communication situation of ICS networks as multigraphs,
the nodes of which represent IP addresses, and the edges
of which represent TCP/UDP port numbers, and estimates
the possibility of the emergence of unobserved links. This
method enables us to avoid many false detections that cannot
be avoided if we use a simple whitelisting method, and
correctly detect genuinely anomalous communications.
We independently collected network traffic for three
manufacturing plants for 2 weeks each. We use 1 week of
data for training and 1 week of data for testing. To investi-
gate how well GCN SCOPE can distinguish between normal
and anomalous triplets, we use the test triplets as negative
samples, and randomly extract triplets as positive samples,
and quantify the performance based on the distinguishability.
The proposed method achieved a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) area under the curve (AUC) of 0.957,
and outperforms baselines including DistMult and two other
heuristics.
Contribution. The main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• We propose a new framework to quantify the anoma-
lies of unobserved communication triplets (consist-
ing of tuples of the server IP address, TCP/UDP
port number, and client IP address) by learning
communication triplets observed in the training data.
• We developed a method based on the framework
above using R-GCNs, and demonstrated that this
method can distinguish communication triplets ob-
served as test data from randomly extracted anoma-
lous triplets while outperforming the accuracy of
baselines such as DistMult, which uses graph em-
bedding such as in an R-GCN, and heuristics, which
score the triplets using the first- and second-order
proximities of the graphs.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows: Related studies are described in Section 2. The
problem statement is outlined in Section 3. Section 4 then
describes the R-GCNs used as components of our proposed
approach. We then show the details of our method in Section
5. Section 6 describes the data collected and presents an
evaluation of our experiment. Finally, Section 7 concludes
this paper.
2. Related Studies
Network-based monitoring methods are roughly divided
into three types: signature-based detection, rule-based de-
tection, and anomaly detection. Although signature-based
detection has few false positives, it can only detect known
attacks. However, an increase in malware variants has de-
creased the signature detection rate. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to utilize other monitoring methods. In rule-based
detection, for example, information on the communication
server and client pair, the protocols used, and the time of
occurrence during a specific period are stored as a whitelist,
and communications that are not present on the whitelist are
detected. Rules can also be manually created by referring
to such information as specifications. Because this method
stores only normal communications as a whitelist, it can
detect unknown attacks. However, if the granularity of the
rules to be created is too coarse, there is a risk of passing
an attack, and if the granularity of the rule is too fine, there
is a risk of causing many false positives.
Among the rule-based detection methods available, an
approach using communication whitelists is considered to
be particularly effective for ICS networks. Barbosa et al.
proposed a method that learns a set of tuples consisting of
the server IP address, client IP address, TCP/UDP, and port
number as a whitelist in a SCADA network, and when the
learning phase ends, an alert is generated for communica-
tions not present on the whitelist. [2]. However, this method
causes many false detections in reality, and as a result,
imposes a heavy load on security analysts, and is often
impractical during an operation. GCN SCOPE does not
provide a binary output as in a simple whitelisting method
but quantifies an anomalous communication not present
on a whitelist, which allows us to focus only on genuine
anomalous communications. Choi et al. pointed out cases
in which we cannot distinguish a client-server correctly,
and where the port numbers used by the clients vary and
proposed a method to deal with such problems. In this
paper, we assume we can extract the server ports accurately
and provide the same service. In fact, we can extract such
information from our dataset using Zeek (formerly Bro) [5].
Furthermore, the client port number tends to vary each time,
and thus we ignore the client port number with our method.
The different types of anomaly detection methods in-
clude traffic anomaly detection methods in which feature
vectors are extracted from traffic of the entire network and
anomalies are detected using machine learning. Yun et al.
proposed an anomaly detection method in which the number
of packets are observed from the traffic of the ICS network
for each pair of source and destination devices for a certain
period and are converted into feature vectors. An anomaly
is detected when the pairs are far from the feature vectors
observed during the training phase. Kitsune [6] efficiently
extracted feature vectors related to traffic in real-time, such
as information related only to the source IP, information
related to the source and destination IPs, and information on
the port number, and the algorithm then detects anomalies
using a reconstruction error of the autoencoder.
However, the traffic anomaly detection methods de-
scribed above work well only when a large deviation (num-
ber of packets, data size, and transmission interval) oc-
curs compared with usual traffic, and they cannot properly
evaluate unobserved communication triplets. In some cases,
Figure 1. An example of a communication triplet
a cyberattack can be conducted with an extremely small
number of packets or data sizes, and in such cases, it
cannot be detected by the traffic anomaly detection methods
described above.
Other anomaly detection methods such as payload-based
detection, and methods based on the N-gram of the byte
strings, are well-known [7], [8], [9].
However, these methods require a high calculation cost
because it is necessary to analyze all packets in the network.
Furthermore, such methods cannot detect attack packets
with payloads similar to the byte string of usually observed
payloads, and do not perform well with a protocol con-
taining many random byte sequences [10]. By contrast, the
proposed method is extremely lightweight because it utilizes
only the connectivity of the communication, and can detect
the activity of an attacker without depending on the packet
payload.
3. Problem Statement
In an ICS network, whitelisting is considered to be effec-
tive as a security monitoring method, where the whitelists
consist of tuples of the server IP address, TCP/UDP port
number, and client IP address (communication triplets) that
have appeared in the past, and a rule-based detection method
is applied that generates an alert when a communication
triplet that has not been previously observed is discovered.
For example, communication triplets have the form shown
in Figure 1. The reasons why this method is suitable for the
ICS network are as follows:
• It operates on the network level, that is, there is no
need to modify the devices.
• In an ICS, new IP addresses and new communication
pairs are unlikely to appear as compared with tradi-
tional IP networks, where the number of legitimate
connections is too large to be manageable.
• It can handle proprietary protocols because it does
not depend on the packet payload.
• Although it is relatively easy to execute a lateral
movement only within observed IP pairs in an ICS
network because of the large number of valid com-
munication IP pairs, it is difficult to execute a lateral
movement within observed communication triplets,
which include TCP/UDP port numbers.
However, this method causes frequent false detections.
The following patterns are factors that cause false positives:
1) Insufficient period of whitelist learning
2) Fundamental changes in communication patterns
3) Unusual communications owing to non-steady op-
eration (maintenance, troubleshooting, etc.)
False positives from 1) may be avoided by sufficiently learn-
ing the whitelists for a lengthy period. However, if we wait
until the whitelist converges, we cannot detect anomalies for
a long time. Moreover, 2) may occur and the whitelist will
need to be retrained before it converges. Avoiding problem
3) is difficult in principle for whitelisting.
To reduce false positives caused by a simple whitelist-
based judgment, we distinguish whether non-whitelisted
communications are caused as the result of a normal ICS
environment operation or the result of an anomalous com-
munication such as a cyberattack.
To realize this, we propose a framework consisting of
the preparation phase, learning phase, and scoring phase,
as in Figure 2. Normal and anomalous communications can
be separated using an output score and the given threshold
value, which is the case with whitelisting. Therefore, the
final output of the framework is the scores of the commu-
nication triplets.
We can quantify the anomalous communication triplets
from normal whitelisted triplets because none of the commu-
nications in an ICS network appear chaotic. The protocols
of communication may depend on the role of the device,
and some communications may be triggered by other com-
munications.
4. Preliminaries
Our method utilizes R-GCNs [4] as the building com-
ponents and we, therefore, describe such networks in this
section. R-GCNs are an extension of graph convolutional
networks (GCNs) [11] for multigraphs. GCNs can be ap-
plied to semi-supervised node classification or a graph auto-
encoder (GAE) [12], and R-GCNs can also be used for such
applications. Herein, we show the graph convolution cal-
culation of R-GCNs, an embedding learning method using
R-GCNs given the learned triplets, and a link prediction
method using a learned node and relation embeddings.
4.1. Relational Graph Convolutional Networks
R-GCNs are related to a class of neural networks operat-
ing on graphs, and were developed specifically to deal with
the highly multi-relational data characteristics of realistic
knowledge bases.
The following notations are introduced: Directed and
labeled multigraphs are denoted as G = (V, E ,R) with
nodes vi ∈ V and labeled edges (relations) (vi, p, vj) ∈ E ,
where p ∈ R is a relation type.
Motivated by the architectures used by GCNs and other
methods, R-GCNs are defined through the following simple
Figure 2. Framework for communication triplet scoring in this study. Communication triplet indicating tuples comprising the sets of (s, p, c), where s is
the server’s IP address, p is the TCP/UDP port number, and c is the client IP address.
propagation model for calculating the forward-pass update
of the entity or node denoted by vi in a relational multi-
graph:
h
(l+1)
i = σ
∑
p∈R
∑
j∈Npi
1
Ci,p
W (l)p h
(l)
j +W
(l)
0 h
(l)
i
 , (1)
where h(l)i ∈ Rd
(l)
is the hidden state of node vi in the l-th
layer of the neural network, N pi denotes the set of neighbor
indices of node i under relation p ∈ R, and W (l)p denotes the
weight matrix for a simple linear transformation depending
on the relation p. In addition, W0 is a weight matrix for
a self-loop, and Ci,p is a problem-specific normalization
constant that can either be learned or chosen in advance
(such as Ci,p = |N pi |).
4.2. Link Prediction Using R-GCN
Link prediction deals with the prediction of new triplets
(i.e., (subject, relation, object)). Formally, a knowledge
base is represented by a directed, labeled graph G =
(V, E ,R). Rather than a full set of edges E, only an incom-
plete subset Eˆ is given. The task is to assign scores f(s, p, c)
to possible edges (s, p, c) to determine how likely those
edges are to belong to E . To tackle this problem, a graph
auto-encoder model was introduced, which is comprised of
an entity encoder and a scoring function (decoder). The
encoder maps each entity vi ∈ V to a real-valued vector
ei ∈ Rd. The decoder reconstructs edges of the graph relying
on the vertex representations; in other words, it scores
(s, p, c)-triplets through a function f : Rd ×R× Rd → R.
The representations through an R-GCN encoder can be
computed as ei = h
(L)
i , similar to the graph auto-encoder
model introduced by Kipf and Welling [12].
As the scoring function, DistMult factorization [13] is
used, which is known to perform well on standard link
prediction benchmarks when used on its own. In Dist-
Mult, every relation p is associated with a diagonal matrix
Rp ∈ Rd×d, and a triple (s, p, c) is scored as follows:
f(s, p, c) = eTs Rpec. (2)
An R-GCN decoder is based on DistMult, and does not
explicitly model the asymmetry in the relation; hence,
f(s, p, c) = eTs Rpec = e
T
c Rpes = f(c, p, s) is true.
The model is trained with negative sampling: For each
observed example ω, negative examples are sampled. The
negative samples are sampled by randomly corrupting either
the subject or object of each positive example. The model
is optimized for a cross-entropy loss to score observable
triplets higher than the negative triplets:
L = − 1
(1 + ω)|Eˆ |
∑
(s,p,c,y)∈T
y log l (f(s, p, c)) +
(1− y) log(1− l (f(s, p, c)) , (3)
where T is the total set of real and corrupted triplets, l is
the logistic sigmoid function, and y is an indicator set to
y = 1 for positive triplets and y = 0 for negative triplets.
5. Proposed Method
In this section, we show the key idea of the proposed
method, GCN SCOPE, and then describe the details of our
approach. The overall flow of the scoring of communication
triplets with the proposed method is shown in Figure 3.
5.1. Key Idea
As described in Section 3, this study aims to detect
anomalous communication triplets based on normal com-
munication triplets observed inside an ICS network. This
problem can be reduced to the problem of link prediction of
multigraphs, which is a task used to predict triplets that are
not clearly given but potentially exist with a high possibility.
The link between particular two devices can be estimated
based on the roles of the devices as represented by their
IP addresses, where the roles indicate the types of device
(such as HMI, PLC, RTU, Data historian, or SIS) and the
communication contents in the network. We hypothesize that
the roles can be recursively estimated by the connectivity
among the roles of the neighbor devices. We, therefore,
focus on R-GCNs because they allow us to recursively
extract embeddings expressing the roles of the devices.
For a role estimation, it is important to propagate the
role information of the connected devices. If a model does
not take the features of each node into account and only
considers the connectivity information, the nodes cannot
obtain the role information of the connected devices. If a
model tries to directly optimize the embeddings of each
device such as in DistMult [13] and not propagate the
embeddings to the connected devices, then the embeddings
of each node tend to overfit the training connections because
the embeddings of each node are independently optimized
for the connecting devices. In fact, as we can see in Section
6, the optimal embedding size of DistMult is smaller than
that of the proposed method.
5.2. Scoring Communication Triplets
We describe the details of our method based on the
framework shown in Figure 2 herein.
5.2.1. Preparation Phase. GCN SCOPE uses the informa-
tion of the communication triplets observed in the target ICS
networks. The communication triplet is the tuple (s, p, c)
where s indicates the server IP address, p is a TCP/UDP
port number, and c represents a client IP address. We have to
extract all communication triplets (s, p, c)s observed during
the learning period. Let the set of all IP addresses, which
emerge as the server IP addresses or client IP addresses, be
V , the set of all the emerging TCP/UDP port numbers be R,
and the set of all emerging communication triplets (s, p, c)
be Eˆ . Note that the proposed method is based on an R-
GCN, which assumes undirected multigraphs. Therefore, if
we observe one communication triplet (s, p, c), we consider
the opposite triplet (c, p, s) as having been observed as well.
The objective of our method is to score communication
triplets in monitored ICS networks, and hence devices out-
side the target networks should be filtered out. For example,
if a target network allows some devices to communicate with
the Internet through a gateway, various IP addresses on the
Internet appear that should be filtered out.
5.2.2. Learning Phase. In this phase, a graph autoencoder
model using an R-GCN learns the communication triplets
observed during the training period. A part of the inputs of
the learning phase is (V, Eˆ ,R) obtained during the prepara-
tion phase. In addition to the inputs above, we have to pro-
vide some hyper parameters to a graph autoencoder model
such as the dropout rate, number of hidden layer units,
L2 regularization weight, the negative sampling rate, and
regularization method (i.e., basis decomposition or block-
diagonal decomposition; for more details, see [4]) and the
parameters described therein.
We then run the learning algorithm of the graph autoen-
coder using the training triplets Eˆ by optimizing the loss
in Equation (3). Finally, the model learns the parameters
Rpi ∈ Rd×d (i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}) is the set of diagonal
matrices of TCP/UDP port number embeddings and the
weights of the R-GCN parameter W (l)pi (i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}), l
is the number of hidden layers). We can also obtain the
embedding of the IP addresses, ei ∈ Rd (i ∈ {1, . . . , |V|}),
by calculating a forward-pass update in Equation (1). The
overall learning algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Communication triplet learning
Input: V: the set of observed IP addresses
Eˆ : the set of trained triplets (s, p, c)
R: the set of observed TCP/UDP port numbers
Output: ei ∈ Rd (i ∈ {1, . . . , |V|}): the embeddings of IP
addresses,
Rpj ∈ Rd×d (j ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}): the embeddings of
TCP/UDP port numbers
1: Learn Rpi (i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}) and W (l)pj (j ∈
{1, . . . , |R|}, l is the number of hidden layers) by min-
imizing the loss in Equation (3)
2: Calculate ei ∈ Rd (i ∈ {1, . . . , |V|}) by calculating the
forward-pass update in Equation (1)
3: return ei (i ∈ {1, . . . , |V|}), Rpj (j ∈ {1, . . . , |R|})
5.2.3. Scoring Phase. In this phase, we consider the scor-
ing target communication triplet (s˜, p˜, c˜). We first check if
Figure 3. Link prediction flow of GCN SCOPE
(s˜, p˜, c˜) is included in the communication triplets Eˆ observed
during the learning period. If (s˜, p˜, c˜) is included in Eˆ ,
(s˜, p˜, c˜) is processed as normal and excluded from the
scoring target. Furthermore, if s˜ or c˜ is a new IP address
or p˜ is a new TCP/UDP port number, it is immediately
processed as an anomalous triplet. In addition, (s˜, p˜, c˜) is
scored using an R-GCN only in cases other than the above
two, that is, cases s˜ and c˜ are in V and p˜ is in R, although
the triplet (s˜, p˜, c˜) is not in Eˆ . In this case, (s˜, p˜, c˜) are
scored using the embeddings ei ∈ Rd (i ∈ {1, . . . , |V|})
and Rpi ∈ Rd×d (i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}) obtained during the
learning phase. The embeddings of (s˜, p˜, c˜) are (es˜, Rp˜, ec˜),
and the score of this triplet is calculated as eTs˜ Rp˜ec˜. The
overall scoring algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
6. Experiment
In this section, we first describe the dataset used in
our experiments, and then explain the baselines used as a
comparison with our method. Finally, we show the results
of two experiments.
6.1. Dataset
In this paper, we used the network traffic of three
factories owned by the company Panasonic for evaluation.
The network monitoring of an ICS is generally conducted
Algorithm 2 Communication triplet scoring
Input: (s˜, p˜, c˜): scoring target triplet,
V: the set of observed IP addresses,
Eˆ : the set of trained triplets (s, p, c),
R: the set of observed TCP/UDP port numbers,
epi ∈ Rd (i ∈ {1, . . . , |V|}): the set of node embed-
dings,
Rpi ∈ Rd×d (i ∈ {1, . . . , |R|}): the set of relation
embeddings in a diagonal matrix
Output: score: the score of (s˜, p˜, c˜)
1: if (s˜, p˜, c˜) ∈ Eˆ then
2: score =∞
3: else if s˜ 6∈ V or c˜ 6∈ V or p˜ 6∈ R then
4: score = −∞
5: else
6: score = eTs˜ Rp˜ec˜
7: end if
8: return score
by collecting packets using a mirror port of an L2 switch,
and the datasets used in this paper are collected in the
same manner. Each factory produces different items, and
the installed facilities, communication protocols, and net-
work configurations are completely different. Along with
industrial protocols such as Modbus and Ethernet/IP, IT-
based protocols such as NetBIOS, DNS, HTTP, HTTPS,
Factory A Factory B Factory C
# of IP addresses 364 150 4109
# of TCP/UDP ports 319 26 328
# of training triplets 2241 2081 23993
# of test triplets 764 558 4302
TABLE 1. Number of IP addresses, TCP/UDP port numbers, training
triplets, and test triplets in an ICS dataset. The training and test triplets
are only composed of unicast communications and are each collected
during one week.
FTP, SMB, RDP, SSH, MSSQL can be observed in these
factories.
In these datasets, only unicast communications are the
targets of learning and scoring, and multicast and broadcast
communications are excluded. As the reason for excluding
these communications, the incorporation of multicasting or
broadcasting will result in the establishment of links with
IP addresses not specifically intended for communications.
The nature of each dataset is shown in Table 1. In Table
1, the numbers of IP addresses, TCP/UDP port numbers,
and training triplets are obtained by counting the numbers of
those that appeared during a specific week, and test triplets
are obtained as follows:
• Test triplets are composed only of triplets from data
immediately following the week of training.
• Triplets included in the training triplets are excluded
from the test triplets.
• Triplets with unobserved IP addresses or TCP/UDP
port numbers are also excluded from the test triplets.
6.2. Baselines
We compare our method with three methods and uni-
form random scores. The three methods are DistMult
[13], first-order proximity-priority heuristic and second-
order proximity-priority heuristic.
DistMult is a method for converting each node into the
embeddings, and the DistMult model is optimized using
Equation 3. In other words, DistMult is equivalent to an
R-GCN without graph convolution layers.
The two heuristics are methods considering first- and
second-order proximities. Many graph-embedding methods
are designed to preserve this nature [14]. A first-order prox-
imity to node vj from a view of node vi is higher if more
edges from vi to vj exist. Let si = [si1, . . . , sin] denote
the first-order proximity between vi and the other nodes.
Then, the second-order proximity to node vj from a view
of node vi is determined based on the similarity of si and sj .
In this paper, we use two variations as heuristics. The first
is a first-order proximity-first heuristic, and the other is a
second-order proximity-first heuristic. The former outputs a
higher score to the node having higher first-order proximity,
and if two nodes have the same first-order proximity, it
outputs a higher score to the node having a higher second-
order proximity. The latter is the opposite method, which
prioritizes second-order proximity.
6.3. Results
To evaluate GCN SCOPE, we conducted two types
of experiments. The first is a prediction performance ex-
periment in which each method predicts the existence of
communication triplets in the test dataset. The other is a
performance experiment in which each method distinguishes
whether each given communication triplet is in the test
dataset or if anomalous triplets are randomly extracted.
With the proposed method, we utilize R-GCNs with
two relational graph convolution layers, and block diagonal
decomposition regularization with a size of 10. As the
reason for using only two graph convolution layers, a a large
number of stacks of graph convolution layers is known to
degrade the performance [15].
The proposed method and DistMult both have multiple
hyper parameters excluding those above. Therefore, we split
the data of factory A into training and validation data,
and search the hyper parameters using Bayes optimization
with 50 iterations, which achieves the best mean reciprocal
rank (MRR) [16] for the validation data. The final hyper
parameters adopted in the proposed method are as follows:
a dropout rate of 0.2, 100 hidden layer units, an L2 regular-
ization weight of 0.0, a learning rate of 0.01, and a negative
sampling rate of 10. The final hyper parameters adopted
in DistMult are as follows: 50 hidden layer units, an L2
regularization weight of 0.01, a learning rate of 0.02, and a
negative sampling rate of 10.
6.3.1. Link Prediction for Test Triplets. We evaluate the
performance of our method and the baselines using the
mean reciprocal rank (MRR) and Hits at n(H@n), where
the models of each method learn the training triplets of each
dataset and output the scores of the test triplets.
MRR =
1
|Q|
|Q|∑
i=1
1
ranki
,
where ranki refers to the rank position of the correct answer
for the i-th query. Here, H@n is the proportion of the correct
entities that are ranked within the top n. This is the standard
metric for link prediction methods.
The results are shown in Table 2. Each metric is eval-
uated in the filtered settings. As shown in Table 2, GCN
SCOPE outperforms the baselines in almost every case,
which means that GCN SCOPE shows a high performance
in link prediction for the communication triplets of ICS
networks.
6.3.2. Distinction between Normal and Anomalous
Links. To investigate how well GCN SCOPE can distinguish
between the normal and anomalous triplets, we quantify the
distinguishability of each method using the AUC of the
ROC curve. We use the test triplets as negative samples,
and randomly extract triplets as positive samples.
Although it is preferable to generate anomalous triplets
based on known cyberattacks or a malware strategy, it
is difficult to know the probability distribution, and thus
Factory A Factory B Factory C
MRR Hits@n MRR Hits@n MRR Hits@n
Model 1 3 10 1 3 10 1 3 10
GCN SCOPE (proposed) 0.240 0.172 0.238 0.366 0.210 0.108 0.222 0.395 0.291 0.167 0.423 0.504
DistMult [13] 0.177 0.096 0.198 0.334 0.161 0.047 0.158 0.435 0.149 0.079 0.174 0.298
1st-order proximity-first heuristic 0.182 0.122 0.189 0.312 0.063 0.006 0.041 0.159 0.192 0.120 0.263 0.287
2nd-order proximity-first heuristic 0.168 0.101 0.179 0.277 0.055 0.009 0.031 0.116 0.151 0.056 0.244 0.286
Random 0.016 0.001 0.005 0.021 0.040 0.007 0.022 0.070 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002
TABLE 2. Link prediction results for triplets observed in test data on real ICS datasets.
Model Factory A Factory B Factory C
GCN SCOPE (proposed) 0.962 0.914 0.996
DistMult [13] 0.262 0.668 0.488
1st-order proximity-first heuristic 0.853 0.735 0.771
2nd-order proximity-first heuristic 0.820 0.632 0.769
Random 0.512 0.521 0.519
TABLE 3. ROC AUC of score-based link distinction on real ICS datasets.
Model Factory A Factory B Factory C
GCN SCOPE (proposed) 0.903 0.764 0.989
DistMult [13] 0.710 0.745 0.900
1st-order proximity-first heuristic 0.767 0.708 0.767
2nd-order proximity-first heuristic 0.768 0.680 0.766
Random 0.554 0.521 0.532
TABLE 4. ROC AUC of rank-based link distinction on real ICS datasets.
random triplets are used instead. We generate random com-
munication triplets by choosing two different IP addresses
and TCP/UDP port numbers separately and uniformly at
random from those observed in the training data, A total of
500 of these anomalous communication triplets are extracted
in each dataset, and each is composed only of triplets not
included in the training and test triplets.
The evaluations are executed in two ways: One method
is a score-based evaluation (Table 3), and the other is a
rank-based evaluation (Table 4). A score-based evaluation
considers how a threshold judgment is executed using the
original output scores. A rank-based evaluation is based on
the harmonic mean of score = 1ranks +
1
rankc
, where ranks
is calculated by finding the ranking of (s, p, c) of all scores
of the filtered communication triplet (s, p, ∗), and rankc is
calculated by finding the ranking of (s, p, c) of all scores
of the filtered communication triplet (∗, p, c). This is an
evaluation metric based on the same idea as that used in
an MRR.
From these evaluations, GCN SCOPE with a score-based
judgment enables us to distinguish normal triplets from
anomalous triplets with high accuracy. The performance of
a score-based evaluation of DistMult is significantly inferior
to that of a rank-based evaluation, the reason for which is
considered to be based on the case of DistMult, in which
all embeddings of the devices are optimized independently,
which causes a different scale of the scores in terms of the
device. By contrast, in the case of an R-GCN, the embed-
dings are jointly optimized unlike with DistMult because of
the effect of the graph convolution.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we developed GCN SCOPE, a method that
learns the embeddings of IP addresses using the learning
of R-GCNs from observed communication triplets (con-
sisting of tuples of server IP addresses, TDP/UDP port
numbers, and client IP addresses), and scores unobserved
communication triplets. To the best of our knowledge, the
proposed method is the first to quantify anomalous com-
munication triplets that have not previously been observed.
With the proposed method, a multigraph is constructed using
communication triplets observed in an ICS network, R-
GCNs models are learned using the extracted multigraph,
and unobserved communication triplets are scored using
learned R-GCNs models. The proposed method achieved an
average AUC of ROC curve of 0.957, which outperforms the
AUCs of comparative methods such as DistMult, a method
that directly optimizes the node embeddings, and heuristics,
which score triplets using the first- and second-order prox-
imities of multigraphs. This means that the operators of a
security operation center using communication whitelisting
are unleashed from the processing of large numbers of
unimportant alerts.
In future studies, the performance changes will be ob-
served using scoring functions when considering the direc-
tion of the edges, such as in TransE [16] or ConvE [17]. It
also seems promising to use not only the edge types such
as the TCP/UDP port numbers but also the communication
data size or communication time interval to enhance the
accuracy of anomalous link detection.
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